I am pleased that Steve Fienberg's article opens a discussion aimed at broadening the scope of statistical methods applied to policy problems. His mezes platter of case studies whets the appetite for a deeper study of these application areas. My further thoughts largely center on just what it means to say that the examples he gives (some quite delicious, especially the aged wine of electoral projections) are "Bayesian." Fienberg argues on a combination of intellectual and historical grounds for a unitary view of Bayesian statistics, thus bringing a broad range of statistical practice and applications under the Bayesian awning. Despite the advantages of such a comprehensive view, it is also useful to distinguish the components, both to clarify their relationships and so consumers of methodology who are not prepared to eat the entire prix fixe dinner can still order off the menu what suits their tastes and nutritional needs. While Fienberg's presentation emphasizes the inferential entrée, the assessment of posterior probabilities, it may help to detail the offerings on the Bayesian menu:
Main courses:
• A subjectivist understanding of probability, allowing for meaningful probability statements about singular events.
• Comprehensive model specification, including -Likelihoods.
-Prior distributions.
• Use of Bayes's theorem to "turn the Bayesian crank," making inferences about parameters (and possibly predictive statements about unobserved or future populations). Optional dishes:
• Subjective priors incorporating substantive prior beliefs.
• Model selection by Bayesian methods; model mixing.
• Hierarchical modeling.
Some of these dishes are commonly ordered a la carte. Obviously, modeling is a central component of statistical practice for statisticians of a variety of schools, although a non-Bayesian generally has more leeway to introduce nonmodel-based procedures (such as resampling methods) into the mix. In particular, despite the theoretical and historical connections Fienberg notes of hierarchical modeling to Bayesian concepts of exchangeability, one need not be a Bayesian to use hierarchical models, applying maximum likelihood estimation at the top level, so-called Maximum Likelihood Empirical Bayes (MLEB), or with some other non-Bayesian procedure. Estimation for level 2 parameters ("random effects" for the frequentist) may proceed using Bayes's law, or by appealing to completely nonBayesian arguments like BLUP (best linear unbiased prediction), thus eating the Bayesian omelet while getting only the faintest whiff of the Bayesian eggs.
Distaste for Bayesian statistical approaches in policy settings arises at various points in this menu. For the census, which each of the 435 members of the House of Representatives views through the lens of its impact on his or her own district, any use of modeling aroused immediate suspicion due to fears of manipulation of possibly arbitrary model specifications. Similar concerns contribute to the general dominance of "design-consistent" classical survey sampling methods in government statistics, even when "model-assisted." It is noteworthy that the statistical objections to using hierarchical models in estimation of census undercount centered on the use of any regression model that pooled information across states, not particularly on the use of a hierarchical model (fully Bayesian or MLEB). Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in 1999 against any use of sampling for census apportionment counts, even with estimation based on the purest of "design-based" principles of unbiased survey estimation, citing con- cerns of susceptibility to manipulation, or at least to controversy. (Oddly enough, the deciding opinion by Justice O'Connor hinged largely on interpretation of a grammatical construction in two apparently conflicting sections of the Census Act, as well as the interpretation of the constitutional phrase "actual enumeration.") It is noteworthy that nonstatistical details of census data-collection methodology that might have equal or greater effects on outcomes, such as the nature of the public awareness efforts or the number of in-person follow-up attempts to mail nonrespondents, are rarely subject to the same degree of scrutiny.
Nonetheless, I agree that the main philosophical objection to entering the Bayesian restaurant at all concerns the choice of prior. In this regard, the distinction between "objective" and "subjective" Bayesian approaches becomes significant. As I understand the objective approach, it does not require the analyst to be committed to a prior as a representation of substantive prior beliefs, but only as a generic device that leads to Bayesian inferences with good frequency properties, that is, one which generates calibrated probability statements, in the spirit of Rubin (1984) . Even improper priors, which since they are not probability distributions cannot be regarded as coherent statements of prior beliefs, are acceptable if they lead to posterior distribution with good frequency properties over the desired range in the hyperparameter space. The analyst gains access to a well-specified inferential approach with a welldeveloped set of techniques for estimation of posterior distributions, and thus "eats a Bayesian omelet made with powdered Bayesian eggs"-perhaps not as tasty a dish as an inference based on a more substantive prior, but nourishing nonetheless. I would place both the census and GOM disability examples of Fienberg's article in this category. In neither of these cases do I see choice of a prior as a significant obstacle. To give a fairly typical example, O'Malley and Zaslavsky (2008) estimated a correlation matrix in a multilevel model using several default priors, comparing results from those that are flexible enough to have desirable properties of nearinvariance to scale. As in Fay and Herriott (1979) , the likelihood at the lowest level of the model is approximated by a non-Bayesian calculation without a complete model for the complex survey data structure.
The subjective Bayesian begins with an informative prior representing substantive beliefs. Such beliefs might be based on expert consensus (elicited directly from experts or drawn from a review of the literature) or inferred from relevant prior data. In the latter case, the evidence might take the form of a likelihood for the previous data, with parameters linked to those presently of interest through a hierarchical model, possibly with default "objective" priors for hyperparameters (or even estimated by MLEB, although the fully Bayesian model more readily accommodates uncertainty about these parameters). For example, we might regard a trial of a new drug as a priori part of an exchangeable sequence (conditional on some covariates) of trials of the same or comparable drugs. (I particularly enjoyed Fienberg's exposition of the successes and tribulations of such Bayesian approaches at the Food and Drug Administration.) The substance of the (scientific and policy) debate over the prior then concerns the choice of the ensemble of relevant previous trials and the specification of the way in which the results are believed to relate to each other, essentially recasting this part of the model as a Bayesian meta-analysis. Metahypotheses about how such evidence should be combined might be evaluated in the long run by the same criteria of goodness of fit and predictive validity as are used in any other model selection problem. Notably, many Bayesians favor such frequency criteria in model selection (Rubin, 1984) , departing from a purely Bayesian paradigm; the latter might suggest relying on model averaging among a number of a priori reasonable models, but this compounds the problem of choosing and justifying a prior distribution.
Fienberg's climate change case study illustrates how a Bayesian perspective offers a principled framework for combination of sources of uncertainty. A simpler example of the same principle concerns microsimulation modeling of food stamp benefits (Zaslavsky and Thurston, 1995; Thurston and Zaslavsky, 1996) . In these models, records on individuals are processed by algorithms representing the application of current program rules and proposed modifications to calculate the impact of possible changes. Uncertainties take a variety of forms: sampling variation in the underlying database, stochastic simulation error, and uncertainty among alternative assumptions about future macroeconomic conditions and about parameters of submodels used to correct measurement error or to impute variables not observed in the underlying surveys. Nonsubjectivist views of probability offer no coherent framework for combining these various forms of uncertainty. From a Bayesian perspective, however, each is a contributor to posterior variation; variance components can be partitioned and attributed to the various kinds of uncertainty by applying ANOVA to results of a designed experiment in which the factors are systematically manipulated. The resulting estimates show which uncertainties are most important for each estimand of interest, and therefore suggest how effort might be best directed to reduce uncertainty by conducting additional simulations, obtaining more data, or seeking more consensus on particular economic or modeling assumptions.
In conclusion, there is too much at stake in current policy-making to require it to rely on a single statistical philosophy. While not everything Fienberg describes is the exclusive property of Bayesians, it may well be the case that only those methodologists whose training gives them a taste for Bayesian perspectives (rather than an allergy to them) will be prepared to apply these tools. I applaud Fienberg for demonstrating, under the general rubric of Bayesian statistics, how modeling in general, hierarchical modeling in particular, and Bayesian philosophical approaches can enrich the toolkit for policy analysis.
